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The conversion of rental apartment buildings into individually-.
owned condominiums has emerged as a common real estate practice in
recent years.' Since 1970, over one-half million apartments have been
converted to condominiums. 2 The pace of conversion activity acceler-
ated throughout the 1970's3 and remains strong despite high interest
rates.4 Conversion, moreover, is spreading from the nation's largest met-
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1. A condominium is a "housing unit in a multi-family building or complex owned by an
individual, who also owns a partial interest in the common areas of the building or complex."
U.S. DEP'T OF HouS. AND URBAN DEV., THE CONVERSION OF RENTAL HOUSING TO CON-
DOMINIUMS AND COOPERATIVES 1-4 (1980) [hereinafter cited as HUD 1980 STUD,]. For the
purposes of this paper, reference to condominiums also includes cooperative apartments. A
cooperative is "a nonprofit housing corporation in which individual households own shares
entitling them to live in a particular unit in a multi-family building or complex and to use the
common areas and facilities of the building or complex." Id at 1-5. See generally, P. ROHAN,
M. RESKIN, I CONDOMINIUM LAW AND PRACTICE Ch. 1 (1981). The main difference be-
tween the cooperative and condominium schemes of ownership is their financial structure. In
condominiums, each unit is a separate piece of real estate and thus purchased with a separate
mortgage. The cooperative purchasers, by contrast, own a share of stock in a corporation that
takes out a blanket mortgage for the entire housing project. A practical effect of this differ-
ence is that the cooperative's owners are liable should any stockholder default in the obliga-
tion to pay a share of the monthly mortgage payment. Condominium owners, as owners of
separate parcels of real estate, are not liable for each other's default.
The differences between condominiums and cooperatives are immaterial for the purposes
of this paper since rental units are transformed into ownership units in both condominium
and cooperative conversions. Thus, the benefits and costs of condominium and cooperative
conversion are nearly identical.
2. See HUD 1980 STUDY, supra note 1, at IV-5, IV-9 (approximately 366,000 rental units
were converted between 1970 and 1979); ADVANCE MORTGAGE CORPORATION, U.S. HOUS-
ING MARKETS I (Subscribers' Special Report, April 24, 1981) (conversion papers were filed
for an estimated 160,000 units in 1980). The 526,000 rental units converted by 1980 represent
over 5% of all units in rental buildings with 5 or more units and about 2% of all occupied
rental units including single family homes and units in buildings with less than five units. See
HUD 1980 STUDY, supra note 1, at IV-9.
3. HUD 1980 STUDY, supra note 1, at IV-5. Seventy-one percent of the decade's total
occurred in 1977-1979. Id at i.
4. The rate of condominium conversion continued to accelerate in 1980 and 1981 despite
the high interest rates that have crippled the rest of the housing industry. ADVANCE MORT-
GAGE CORPORATION, supra note 2, at 1. An even greater surge in conversion activity is antici-
pated once mortgage interest rates fall. Id. at 2. HUD 1980 STUDY, supra note 1, at VII-43
(projecting between 1,056,000 and 1,140,000 units will be converted between 1980 and 1985);
Condos Take Over the Real-Estate Market, 89 U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT 78 (November 10,
1980) (reporting a nationwide condominium craze).
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ropolitan areas into smaller cities.5
Many commentators have viewed condominium conversion as a con-
structive force. They contend that it provides additional homeowner-
ship opportunities and reduces urban decay. 6 The primary drawback of
conversion, according to these analysts, is the displacement of poor and
elderly tenants from the converted buildings.7 To retain the benefits of
conversion while reducing its harms, these commentators urge that con-
version be permitted to continue but that the process be regulated to
mitigate the effects of displacement.8 They advocate measures that pro-
vide tenants a reasonable opportunity to purchase their residences and
that reduce the difficulties encountered by those forced to move.9 This
standard view of condominium conversion miscalculates the social bene-
fits and costs of conversion, however, and therefore underestimates the
need for governmental action to curb conversion activity.
This analysis of conversion activity begins by discussing the forces
that generate condominium conversion and identifies the preferential
federal income tax treatment of homeownership properties as the most
important single factor fueling the conversion boom. The article then
examines the costs and benefits of condominium conversion. Since the
attractiveness of condominium conversion is largely a product of federal
tax policy, the social benefits of conversion activity have been exagger-
ated. By contrast, conversion's costs have been underestimated because
its adverse effect on the lower-income housing stock has been mis-
perceived. After evaluating various ways of addressing the problems as-
sociated with conversion, the article concludes by proposing denial of
preferential tax treatment to owners of newly converted condominiums.
5. Condominium conversion had remained a limited phenomenon nationally until re-
cently as much of the nation's conversion activity had been concentrated in the largest metro-
politan areas. HUD 1980 STUDY, supra note 1, at IV-8 (76% of all conversion between 1970
and 1979 occurred in the largest 37 Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA's) and
59% of all conversions took place in 12 of the 37 SMSA's); ADVANCE MORTGAGE CORPORA-
TION, supra note 2, at 1. For example, conversion doubled in 1980 in the medium and smaller
markets of the five states that keep full conversion records. Id. at 1.
6. See, e.g., NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS, DISPLACEMENT DUE TO CONDOMIN-
IUM CONVERSION: SOME EVIDENCE 12 (1979); Comment, The Condominium Conversion Problem.-
Causes and Solutions, 1980 DUKE L.J. 306, 307.
7. See, e.g., UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT,
Condominium Cooperative Study V-34 (1975) (hereinafter cited as HUD 1975 STUDY);
Comment, The Regulation of Rental Apartment Conversions, 8 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 507, 513
(1980).
8. Note, Condominium Conversion-Balancng Tenants' Rights and Property Owners' Interests, 27
WAYNE L. REV. 349, 365 (1980).
9. See, e.g., DIVISION OF FLORIDA LAND SALES AND CONDOMINIUMS, DEPARTMENT OF
BUSINESS REGULATION, STATE OF FLORIDA, CONDOMINIUM CONVERSION IN FLORIDA: A
REPORT TO GOVERNOR BOB GRAHAM 39 (1980). The report also recommends actions to
encourage new rental apartment construction.
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This proposal would decrease the rate of condominium conversion and
its accompanying harms by removing governmentally created incentives
to convert. This would allow conversion to continue in those markets
where the other benefits of conversion outweigh its costs. It would also
avoid the need for complex and costly regulation of conversion activity.
I. The Causes of Condomi'nium Conversion
The main force behind the surge in condominium conversion is the
shortage of homeownership opportunities that has developed in recent
years. In large part, the demand for homeownership has grown due to
an array of federal income tax incentives which provide a tremendous
subsidy to homeowners.' 0 The ability of homeowners to deduct mort-
gage interest" and property taxes12 while not reporting any imputed
income 1 3 from ownership creates a tax shelter of considerable value . 4
In addition, the capital gains provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
make any appreciation in home value nearly tax-free. ' 5 Taken together,
these tax subsidies transform homeownership into a superior investment
opportunity. 16
10. E. BOURDON, CONDOMINIUM CONVERSIONS: POSSIBLE CHANGES IN FEDERAL TAX
LAWS TO DISCOURAGE CONDOMINIUM CONVERSIONS AND ASSIST RENTAL HOUSING CRS-
2-CRS-3 (Congressional Research Service Report No. 80-71E, 1980) (tax laws provide strong
incentives for middle and upper income households to purchase housing).
11. I.R.C. § 163 (1982).
12. I.R.C. § 164(a)(1) (1982).
13. E. BOURDON, supra note 10, at CRS-3 (owners of homes who in effect rent to them-
selves are not required to pay tax on this derived value). Seegenerall y, B. BIT-KER, L. STONE,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 80-85 (5th ed., 1980).
14. This tax shelter is estimated to have saved homeowners over $16 billion in federal
income taxes in 1979, an amount that was expected to increase to over $22 billion by 1981. E.
BOURDON, supra note 10, at CRS-3 (estimates are adjusted downward to reflect the effect of
the standard deduction). For the family that purchased an average priced new home in 1981,
the value of these deductions would total about $3100 annually. This figure is based on the
median sales price for a new single family home in April 1981 which was $69,300. N.Y.
Times, June 3, 1981, at D7, col. 1.
15. Taxpayers are able to defer capital gains by purchasing a new residence within 24
months of the sale of their previous home. I.R.C. § 1034 (1982). Taxpayers are also entitled
to a one-time, non-recognition of capital gain up to $125,000 once they reach age 55. I.R.C.
§ 121 (1982). Even the portion of the gain subject to taxation usually will be taxed at a low
rate since taxpayers exercising the one-time non-recognition feature are elderly and usually in
low tax brackets.
16. Downs, Too Much CapitalforHousing?, 17 THE BROOKINGS BULLETIN 2 (The Bookings
Institution, Summer, 1980) (housing as an investment offers extraordinary tax advantages
compared to all other investment alternatives); Goetze, The Housing Bubble, 8 WORKING PA-
PERS FOR A NEW SOCIETY 44, 45 (January-February, 1981) (federal tax code strongly favors
investment in housing); Sahling, Stern, Co-op Fever in New York City, 5 FEDERAL RESERVE
BANK OF NEW YORK QUARTERLY REVIEW 17 (Spring, 1980) (co-op, condominium, and
home ownership provide a practical, increasingly valuable tax shelter).
A number of other factors are usually cited along with the tax laws as contributing to the
economic attractiveness of homeownership. These factors include the appreciation in the
home's value due to the inflation in home prices, the leveraged nature of a home purchase in
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Although most of these tax preferences have existed for decades, their
attractiveness has increased in recent years as inflation has pushed
households into higher federal income tax brackets. 7 As individuals
creep into higher marginal brackets, the value of tax deductions and
other tax avoidance devices increases proportionally.l 8 As a result, more
middle income households are finding that homeownership offers them
substantial economic benefits. 19
This increased demand for homeownership has developed during a
period when the expansion of homeownership opportunities has slowed.
Due to high interest rates20 and inflation in construction costs, 2' the con-
struction of single-family residences and newly-built condominium units
has slowed since the early 1970's.22 The housing stock increased only
23% over the decade of the seventies. 23 The number of households in
which the homeowner receives all the appreciation although only a 20% downpayment was
made, and the ability to freeze housing costs at the same monthly payment for the next thirty
years. See Downs, supra at 2.
Although these factors do contribute to the economic value of homeownership, the preemi-
nent factor is the tax treatment of homeownership. The critical importance of the tax factor
can be seen by comparing household A which purchases its home and household B which
continues to rent an apartment but purchases a house as an investment. The only difference
between real estate investors A and B is that household A lives in its investment and B does
not. Both A and B will benefit from property appreciation and will be able to purchase on a
leveraged basis. Because B's own rental payments will increase at approximately the same
pace as its rental income from its investment property, both A and B will be able to freeze
their housing costs. Since household B can obtain an investment with comparable benefit to
homeownership except for the favorable tax treatment afforded homeowners, tax incentives
are the crucial factor in the family's decision to invest in their home instead of in other real
estate or, for that matter, in a range of other alternatives.
17. E. BOURDON, supra note 10, at CRS-4. In 1967, 5.5 million of 58.9 million taxpayers
or 9.3% of all taxpayers were taxed at a 25% or higher marginal rate. INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE, STATISTICS OF INCOME-1967, INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS 76 (1969). By
1977, 26.4 million of 81.7 million taxpayers or 32.3% of all taxpayers were taxed at a 25% or
higher marginal rate, an increase of 480%. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, STATISTICS OF
INCOME-1977, INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS 94 (1979). See also D. HAIDER, EcO-
NOMICS, HOUSING, AND CONDOMINIUM DEVELOPMENT 60 (Center for Urban Affairs, North-
western University, 1980) (a family with the average income was taxed at the 27% marginal
rate in 1976 and at the 29% marginal rate in 1977 although purchasing power did not
increase).
18. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS, supra note 6, at 6.
19. EMERGENCY CONDOMINIUM AND COOPERATIVE CONVERSION COMM'N, DISTRICT
OF COLUMBIA, FINAL REPORT 23 (1979) (tax and investment incentives have interested in-
creasing numbers of renters in homeownership).
20. DEP'T OF HoUs., STATE OF CONNECTICUT, CONDOMINIUM CONVERSION: AN IN-
TERIM RESPONSE 19, (1980) (Federal Reserve Board restrictions on the money supply in-
crease interest rates and thereby inhibit new construction).
21. D. HAIDER, supra note 17, at 7 (citing statistics on the increased cost of residential
construction).
22. Construction of single unit structures has proceeded at sub-par levels in four of the
past eight years. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HOUSING STARTS:
JULY 1981 2, 3 (Construction Report C20-81-7, September 1981). This pattern has been even
more pronounced in structures with five or more units. Id at 2, 3.
23. Overall, between the 1970 Census and October 1979, 18,636,000 new units were built
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the U.S. jumped by 27%.24 With a growing number of households de-
manding homeownership and only minor increases in the supply, a
shortage of homeownership opportunities has developed, increasing the
value of those opportunities that do come onto the market and pricing
housing ownership beyond the reach of many families.2 5
The conversion of apartment buildings into condominiums is able to
alleviate this shortage of homeownership opportunities. 26  The con-
verted units are attractive to potential home buyers for several reasons.
The households who purchase and reside in these individually owned
apartments receive the same tax and investment benefits as the owners
of single-family homes. They are also affordable to many households
that would otherwise be closed off from ownership by spiraling single-
family home prices. 2 7 Additionally, converted condominiums are ap-
pealing because the apartment buildings that have been converted have
usually been high-quality structures in prime locations. 28
The conversion option is also attractive to the owners of rental apart-
ment buildings. By converting to condominiums, the building owner is
able to charge 60%-100% more for each condominium unit than its mar-
ket value as a rental apartment. 29 The prime reason for the increased
and 6,742,000 existing units were lost due to abandonment or demolition. This 12 million
increase in dwelling units represents a 17% increase in the housing stock. Adding 4,296,000
"unspecified additions" to the housing stock caused by subdivision of existing units and con-
version of non-residential structures, the housing stock increased by 16.2 million units or
23.1%. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. AND URBAN DEV., ANNUAL Hous-
ING SURVEY: 1979 pt. A, XV-XVI (Current Housing Reports Series H-150-79, 1981).
24. N.Y. Times, May 26, 1981, at Al, col. 2.
25. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE U.S., RENTAL HOUSING: A NATIONAL PROBLEM
THAT NEEDS IMMEDIATE ATTENTION 8 (General Accounting Office Report No. CED-80-1 1,
1979) (the cost of homeownership has priced an increasing number of families out of the new
home market).
High home prices have made it increasingly difficult to accumulate a downpayment for
first-time home buyers. In addition, the combination of high prices and high interest rates
has increased the monthly mortgage payment beyond the capacity of many families. PRESI-
DENT'S COMM'N. ON HOUSING, INTERIM REPORT, October 30, 1981, p. 2.
26. J. SILVER, C. SHREVE, CONDOMINIUM CONVERSION CONTROLS 9 (U.S. Dep't of
Hous. and Urban Dev., 1979).
27. B. HEUDORFER, CONDOMINIUM DEVELOPMENT IN BOSTON 61 (BOSTON REDEVEL-
OPMENT AUTHORITY, 1980) ("in many parts of the country condominium conversions do
expand ownership opportunities for those priced out of the detached single family housing
market"); E. BOURDON, supra note 10, at CRS-8 (conversion provides a new supply of homes
for young people, divorced individuals, one income households, and other groups who can not
afford or do not want a $100,000 detached house).
28. HUD 1980 STUDY, supra note 1, at vii-viii. See, e.g., Sahling, Stern, supra note 16, at
13 (co-op conversions in Manhattan have been concentrated in relatively well-to-do neigh-
borhoods in newer and more desirable buildings). See generally, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
REALTORS, supra note 7, at 4-9.
29. D. HAIDER, supra note 17, at 8 (units worth sixty times monthly rents as rental units
are worth 110 times monthly rents as condominiums); Goetze, supra note 16, at 50 (rental
apartments worth four to six times the annual rent roll start at ten times annual gross rent as
condominiums); E. BOURDON, supra note 10, at CRS- I I (a unit worth $25,000 as an invest-
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price of the units as condominiums is the disparate tax treatment of
homeownership and investor-owned properties. 30 In contrast with the
substantial benefits that the Internal Revenue Code extends to home-
owners, the federal tax treatment of investor-owned rental properties is
not favorable. For an investor, mortgage interest and property tax pay-
ment deductions may merely offset the building's reported rental in-
come and do not create a tax shelter. The building's operating expenses
may also be deducted, however.3 1 The deduction for the building's de-
preciation does create a tax subsidy for the investor, 32 but this deduction
is comparatively small and is recaptured upon sale of the building.3 3
Finally, the investor is subject to a capital gains tax on any appreciation
in the value of the property without the deferral and non-recognition
provisions that are available to homeowners. 34
This disparity in the tax treatment of investor-owned and resident-
owned properties creates an opportunity for an apartment building
owner to increase the building's tax subsidy by shifting ownership to a
ment may sell for between $50,000-$60,000 as a condominium); CITY DEv. DEP'T, KANSAS
CITY, MISSOURI, CONDOMINIUM CONVERSION IN KANSAS CITY 33 (Technical Bulletin No.
5, 1979) (converted condominiums commonly sell for 2 1/2 times their value as investor-
owned apartments).
30. Many commentators claim that apartment building owners are interested in conver-
sion because of the deteriorating profit margins that are plaguing the rental housing industry.
Eg., Comment, supra note 6, at 311. Those buildings that are converted to condominiums
are not typical rental buildings, however; they are prime buildings with residents of some
means. See note 28, supra. Thus, the key factor that has held rents down and reduced land-
lord profits-the inability of lower income renters to pay market rents-is not present in those
buildings undergoing conversion. Stanfield, Caught in the Squeeze of the Rental Rousing Market,
11 NATIONAL JOURNAL 262, 264 (February 17, 1979) (landlords have been unable to raise
rents sufficiently because the lower income families that increasingly compose the renter class
cannot absorb the higher rents).
Other commentators have argued that rent control has spurred conversion activity by di-
minishing the profitability of rental housing. See, e.g. , Harter, Rent Controls Forcing Condo Con-
versions, 39 MORTGAGE BANKER 46 (July, 1979). However, the HUD 1980 study concluded
that rent controls were not a leading cause of condominium conversion because so few of the
jurisdictions with conversions have enacted such measures. HUD 1980 STUDY, supra note 1,
at V-17. In fact, if the source of landlords' interest in condominium conversion was the avoid-
ance of rent regulation, one would wonder why renters would be interested in purchasing
condominium units since the conversion would permit the owner to increase her profits at
their expense.
31. I.R.C. §§ 162-164 (1982). Operating expense deductions also only offset rental
income.
32. I.R.C. §§ 167 (1982). See D. HAIDER,supra note 17, at 13 (depreciation is a tax break
for real estate investors since it does not reflect the property's actual expenses or economic
depreciation).
33. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS, supra note 6, at 10; I.R.C. § 1016 (1982).
Amendments to the Internal Revenue Code in 1969 reduced the depreciation subsidy by
altering the method by which a used rental building can be depreciated. NATIONAL ASSOCI-
ATION OF REALTORS, supra note 6, at 10. Depreciation is recaptured at the lower capital
gains rate, however.
34. I.R.C. § 1001 (1982). See note 16, supra.
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group of residents.35 Even though the tax subsidy is channeled initially
to the condominium buyer, the apartment building owner is able to
share in the increased value of the property because the homeownership
subsidy increases the sum households are willing to pay for the condo-
minium unit.
Apartment building owners are often reluctant to convert, however,
for fear of losing capital gains treatment of their investment 36 or because
of inexperience with conversion and its risks.3 7 In these instances, a con-
dominium converter with expertise in the creation and marketing of
condominiums may purchase the property from the owner at a price in
excess of its value as a rental building and sell the units as condomini-
ums.3 8 In the process of negotiating the sale to the converter, the origi-
nal building owner and the converter divide the financial benefits of
transferring the building from the rental market to the ownership
market. 39
The logic of conversion, then, is clear: by altering the ownership
structure of a building to improve its tax treatment, the property gains
in value. This increase is then apportioned among the transaction's par-
ticipants. 4° Apartment building owners are able to sell their buildings
35. Tamarkin, Condomania in Chicago, 122 FORBES 54, 56 (November 13, 1978) (tax policy
has encouraged conversion by subsidizing owners rather than renters); B. HEUDORFER, supra
note 27, at 46, 101 (explicit federal tax policy is in large part responsible for conversion's
proliferation).
36. A building owner who converts an apartment building herself begins to take on the
markings of a dealer and risks being taxed at ordinary income rates on the building's entire
appreciation. In most instances, an owner is better off selling at a lesser price to a converter
but retaining capital gains treatment. For a discussion of the difficulties in acquiring capital
gains treatment of a conversion by an apartment building investor, see Miller, Can A Straight
Condominium Conversion Produce A Capital Gain, 54 J. OF TAXATION 8 (January, 1981); Livsey,
Minimizing the Tax Consequences of Condominium Conversions and Other Real Property Developments, I
N.Y.U. 39TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION 28-1 (1981): ADVANCE MORT-
GAGE CORPORATION, supra note 2, at 3.
37. D. HAIDER, supra note 17, at 19 (apartment building owners without expertise may
not wish to risk proceeding with a conversion).
38. HUD 1980 STUDY, supra note 1, at iii (converters are willing to pay prices for rental
properties far in excess of their value as rentals).
39. See D. HAIDER, supra note 17, at 20 (the price paid by the converter for the building,
conversion expenses, and the condominium market determine the converter's profit). As con-
version has become more common, owners of rental buildings have understood the potential
value of their buildings to converters and have insisted on higher prices. Chicago Tribune,
June 21, 1981, at 1, col. 5; ADVANCE MORTGAGE CORPORATION, supra note 2, at 3. Although
estimates vary, converters are able to make a substantial profit. D. HAIDER, supra note 17, at
20-21 (converter profits equal 10% to 20% of gross condominium sales); CITY DEV. DEP'T,
supra note 30, at 37 (25%-30% net profit); TAMARKIN, supra note 35, at 59 (returns on invest-
ment of from 6% to 500%). Because converters contribute only a small portion of the capital
needed to purchase the building and borrow the remainder, the profits gained by converters
are even larger when compared to their equity participation in the transaction. Comment,
supra note 6, at 313.
40. D. HAIDER, supra note 17, at 9 (apartment building owners, converters, and condo-
minium buyers all obtain financial benefits from conversion).
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at a greater price than they would receive from a rental building inves-
tor. Converters receive a healthy profit for their participation in the
transaction as middlemen. And the condominium unit buyers gain the
tax and investment advantages of homeownership that were unavailable
to them due to the price and short supply of single family homes.
II. The Benefits Created by Condomiium Conversion
A. The Benefits For Participants In Conversion Activity
The major beneficiaries of the conversion of an apartment building
into condominiums are the participants in the transaction: the real es-
tate investor who owns the building, the condominium converter who
purchases the building from the investor and sells the apartments as in-
dividual units, and the condominium buyers who purchase and reside in
the apartments. 4 1 The financial benefits to participants are described in
the previous section.42
B. Conversion's Effect on Urban Conditions
The other important benefit commonly attributed to conversion is its
contribution to urban revitalization. The general notion of conversion
activity underlying these claims is that conversion is an element of the
broader urban revitalization movement in which deteriorating buildings
in marginal neighborhoods are rehabilitated for middle class "urban pi-
oneers." 43 The perceived benefits of this activity are the renovation of
the urban housing stock, the improvement of the center city tax base,
and the return of the middle classes to the cities.
44
In reality, conversion has had at best a modest impact on urban con-
ditions. Conversion activity has been divided evenly between urban
41. See text and notes accompanying notes 27-40, infra.
42. These "benefits" arise from the favorable tax treatment of converted units, and are
thus offset by the loss of tax revenues.
43. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 6, at 316 (conversion helps revitalize blighted and de-
caying neighborhoods by saving many dwelling units from abandonment and demolition and
by increasing resident stability).
44. The HUD 1980 STUDY reported that condominium purchasers are mostly white, rela-
tively young, small households with higher than average incomes and managerial and profes-
sional jobs. See HUD 1980 STUDY, supra note 1, at Ch. VI (condominium buyers are 90%
white; 48% are under 36 years old; 57% are one person and 35% are two person households;
39% earn over $30,000; 65% hold managerial or professional positions). Local studies gener-
ally confirm the HUD conclusions. See, e.g., J. DINKELSPIEL, J. UCHENICK, H. SELESNICK,
CONDOMINIUMS: THE EFFECTS OF CONVERSION ON A COMMUNITY 76-81 (1981) (of condo-
minium buyers in Brookline, Massachusetts, 57% were under 40 years old; households aver-
aged 1.95 persons including .35 children per household; 44% were married; the mean income
was $27,830; 71% were employed in professional, technical or managerial positions). See also
note 83 infra for income data on condominium buyers.
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centers and suburban jurisdictions. 45 The activity that has occurred in
the inner cities has centered on prime urban neighborhoods and in-
volved high quality structures. 46 Because only cosmetic improvements
have typically been made to these buildings, conversion has had a rela-
tively minor effect on the quality of the urban housing.47 In the long
run, conversion may protect the housing stock because condominium
owners may maintain their buildings better than rental building
investors.
The immediate effect of conversion on the real estate tax base of inner
cities has also been minimal. Although converted buildings have not
received substantial renovation, their tax assessments have risen to re-
flect the increase in their market values as condominiums. 48 Neverthe-
less, when compared to the total assessed value of a city's real property,
these increases are very insignificant. 49
Perhaps the most valuable contribution of conversion to the urban
environment is its role in encouraging middle class households to remain
in or return to the cities. Conversion may begin to reverse the long-term
process of economic segregation that has left high concentrations of poor
households in the cities while wealthier households have fled to the sub-
urbs.5 0 By creating homeownership opportunities for the middle classes
in the cities,5' conversion might assist in the rejuvenation of urban econ-
omies. Middle class households may in some cases spur the local econ-
omy and spin off job opportunities and similar benefits for other city
residents. Whether these benefits will in fact develop remains uncertain;
the middle class residents may merely create an economic life that is
separate from and yields few benefits to the city's less affluent resi-
dents. 52 In any case, the scope of the benefits that are received by poor,
45. HUD 1980 STUDY, supra note 1, at IV-8. While 76% of conversion activity between
1970 and 1979 occurred in the largest 37 SMSA's, see note 2 supra, only 49% of these conver-
sions were in center city areas; the other 51% occurred in suburbs.
46. See note 28, supra.
47. HUD 1980 STUDY, supra note 1, at 111-4, 111-5, VIII-27, VIII-28 (75% of inner city and
85% of suburban conversion involve only cosmetic improvements or are sold "as is");
Tamarkb?, supra note 36, at 59 (only 25% of converted buildings receive more than cosmetic
changes).
48. HUD 1980 STUDY, supra note 1, at VIII-5, VIII-1I (increases in valuation found not
to be caused by building improvements); B. HEUDORFER,supra note 27, at 63 (assessments of
apartment buildings increased 40% on the average after conversion).
49. HUD 1980 STUDY, supra note 1, at VIII-9 (San Francisco experienced a .0002% in-
crease in total assessments due to conversion, the largest increase among SMSA's with major
conversion activity).
50. Comment, supra note 6, at 314-316.
51. J. KAIN, H. LEONARD, K. CASE, CONDOMINIUM CONVERSION IN MASSACHUSETTS 3
(Greater Boston Real Estate Board, 1980) (condominiums provide the only form of home-
ownership suitable for most of the existing housing stock in the central cities).
52. The return of middle class families may merely add to the economic diversity of a
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inner city residents must be contrasted with the costs that conversion
places upon them.
III. The Harms of Conversion Actity
A. The Eect of Conversion On A Bui/ding's Tenants
Those individuals most obviously affected by conversion are the
apartment building tenants who must choose either to buy their apart-
ments or move elsewhere. On the average, over 70% of the tenants who
reside in a building undergoing conversion are displaced.5'  Approxi-
mately 20% of the tenants purchase their apartment and the rest remain
as renters in their apartments which have been bought by investors.5 4
Some purchasers, however, decide to buy their units for negative rea-
sons. These households purchase reluctantly because they wish to avoid
a disturbing move or because they are concerned with their ability to
locate suitable replacement housing. The number of defensive
purchases by tenants is quite significant. 55
Considerable public attention has been focused on the effects of con-
version on those households who are displaced from their residences. 5 6
city's population, but not create an economic renewal with benefits for all urban residents.
Cf Hartmann, Displacement-A Not So New Problem, in URBAN HOUSING 296 (Federal Home
Loan Bank of San Francisco, 1978) (a city's problems may be ameliorated when the middle
class replace the poor, but the return of the middle class does not address the plight of the
poor).
53. The percentage of tenants forced to move by conversion varies by building and by
city. Not surprisingly, the studies of conversion-induced displacement report inconsistent
findings regarding the extent of displacement. Few studies, however, report less than 70%
displacement. HUMAN RELATIONS COMM'N, CITY OF EVANSTON, ILL., CONDOMINIUM CON-
VERSION IN THE CITY OF EVANSTON 19 (1978) (80% of tenants plan not to buy); HUD 1975
STUDY, supra note 7 at V-35 (75-85% displacement); HUD 1980 STUDY, supra note 1, at VI-2
(58% displacement); SAN FRANCISCO DEP'T OF CITY PLANNING, MEMBERS OF THE REAL
ESTATE INDUSTRY, CONDOMINIUM CONVERSIONS IN SAN FRANCISCO iii (1978) (75% of pre-
conversion tenants had to relocate) (hereinafter cited as San Francisco Study); Lauber, Condo-
minium Conversions-The Number Prompts Controls To Protect The Poor and Elderly, 37 J. OF HOUS-
ING 209 (1980) (citing a variety of studies reporting between 75% and 95% displacement).
54. HUMAN RELATIONS COMM'N, supra note 53, at 30 (20% of tenants purchase their
unit); B. Heudorfer, supra note 28, at 57 (25% of tenants purchase); CITY OF CAMBRIDGE,
CONDOMINIUM CONVERSIONS IN CAMBRIDGE 2 (1978) (20% of tenants purchase); DEVELOP-
MENT ECONOMICS GROUP, CONDOMINIUM AND COOPERATIVE CONVERSIONS IN THE DIS-
TRICT OF COLUMBIA 1 (October 1978) (24% of tenants purchase); HUD 1980 STUDY, supra
note 1, at VI-2, VI-l 1 (22% of tenants purchase units and investors purchase 19% of converted
units); Tamarkin, supra note 35, at 57 (8-15% of converted units are investor-owned); SAN
FRANCISCO STUDY, supra note 53, at 54 (11% of converted units are investor-owned).
55. HUD 1980 STUDY, supra note I, at VI-10 (23% of tenant purchasers buy their unit to
avoid a move); BALTIMORE STUDY, infra note 62, at 33 (43% of tenant purchasers consider
themselves reluctant purchasers); Lauber, supra note 53, at 204 (75% of tenant buyers in Palo
Alto did so reluctantly); G. LONGHINI, D. LAUBER, CONDOMINIUM CONVERSION REGULA-
TIONS: PROTECTING TENANTS 3, 4 (American Planning Association, PAS Report No. 343,
1979).
56. Eg. , J. SILVER, C. SHREVE, supra note 26, at 1.
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The central concern is that those tenants who are forced to move are
predominantly poor or elderly and experience trauma in losing their
home and difficulty in locating a satisfactory substitute. 57
The data available from a variety of case studies runs counter to these
common perceptions of the effects of displacement. 58 Displaced house-
holds fare surprisingly well in their search for substitute housing. Most
of those displaced are able to locate housing of comparable cost and size
within three months of receiving notice of conversion. 59 Most remain in
the same city and many find apartments in the same neighborhood. 60
The evidence on displacement underlines the misperception that per-
vades much of the study concerning the nature of conversion. Conver-
sion activity is often thought to focus on distressed rental properties.
Because conversion typically involves higher-grade buildings, however,
those who are displaced do not resemble the populations of ethnic poor
that were uprooted by the urban renewal and highway construction
programs of the 1960's.61 Only twenty-eight percent of the displaced
tenants are poor or elderly. 62 Since the converted buildings are strong
57. E.g., TENANT ADVOCACY TECHNICAL AD Hoc TASK FORCE IN EMERGENCY CONDO-
MINIUM AND COOPERATIVE CONVERSION COMMISSION, supra note 19, at 38.
58. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS, supra note 6, at 2; J. KAIN, H. LEONARD, K.
CASE, supra note 51, at 71.
59. The HUD 1980 Study reported a startling degree of success for those displaced tenants
searching for housing. Rents typically increase by less than 10% after displacement. Less
than 20% of the displaced rate their new residence as inferior in quality to their previous
home. Ninety percent indicate satisfaction with their new housing. HUD 1980 STUDY, supra
note 1, at vi. Studies of conversion activity in particular cities are in general agreement with
the HUD results. SAN FRANCISCO STUDY, supra note 53, at 44, 47 (rents for displaced house-
holds went down slightly, an average housing search took three months); DEVELOPMENT Ec-
ONOMICS GROUP, supra note 54, at 2, 25 (in the District of Columbia rents went up 17.9%, but
apartment size increased an average of .22 bedrooms, average housing search took two
months); CITY OF CAMBRIDGE, supra note 54, at 23, 24, 29 (most tenants able to relocate
within two months, 71% paid higher rents, but 87% were satisfied with their new housing);
EMERGENCY CONDOMINIUM AND COOPERATIVE CONVERSION COMM'N, supra note 19, at 41
(53% of displaced tenants in the District of Columbia paid higher rents, 15% paid less rent).
60. DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS GROUP, supra note 54, at 23-24 (45% of the displaced
relocated in the same neighborhood and 75% within the District of Columbia); HUD 1980
STUDY, supra note 1, at IX-18-IX-20 (72% moved out of their neighborhood, 85% considered
their new neighborhood as good if not better than their preconversion neighborhood, and
80% lived as close if not closer to friends and relatives); SAN FRANCISCO STUDY, supra note
53, at 46 (only a slight dispersal of displaced households from their former neighborhoods).
61. HARTMANN, supra note 52, at 298.
62. HUD 1980 STUDY, supra note 1, at IX-14 (poor is defined as under $12,500, elderly as
over 65 years of age). The HUD 1980 STUDY reports that twenty percent of displaced tenants
are poor and about 20% are elderly. Because 60% of the elderly who are displaced are also
poor, a total of 28% of the displaced population is poor and/or elderly. Id. at VI-18. Similar
results were found in the majority of case studies. DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS GROUP, supra
note 54, at 22, 23 (21% of displaced households had members over 65, 14% had an annual
income less than $10,000); SAN FRANCISCO STUDY, supra note 53, at 37, 40 (18% of displaced
tenants over 61, 13% had incomes less than $10,000); CITY OF CAMBRIDGE, Supra note 54, at
19, 20 (24% over age 61, 30.8% earned less than $10,000); HUMAN RELATIONS COMM'N, supra
136
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rental properties, the tenants who are displaced generally have some
economic resources at their disposal. 63 With these resources, they are
able to re-enter the housing market and, on the whole, obtain satisfac-
tory substitutes to their current apartments without great difficulty.64
Although most displaced tenants are able to shoulder a move without
severe repercussions, displacement is a difficult experience for those that
are poor or elderly. The poor lack the resources to compete effectively
in a tight rental market and their search for housing is less successful
than that of the rest of the displaced population.65 For the elderly, a
forced move can be emotionally and physically traumatic."" In addi-
tion, their new homes may isolate them from their traditional
communities.
6 7
Despite the fact that the effects of conversion on the tenants of the
converted building are not so drastic as commonly perceived, the bur-
dens that conversion imposes on all tenants, especially poor and elderly
tenants, are not insignificant. 68 It is likely, moreover, that in the future
the problems of displacement will become more severe as conversions
exhaust the higher quality housing stock and spread to other neighbor-
hoods forcing greater numbers of the poor and elderly into an increas-
ingly tight rental market. 69
note 53, at 7 (18% over age 65, 9.8% earned less than $10,000); DEP'T OF Hous. AND COMMU-
NITY DEv., CITY OF BALTIMORE, CONDOMINIUMS: BALTIMORE CITY 37, 38 (1980) (herein-
after cited as BALTIMORE STUDY) (69.1% over age 62, 19.6% earned less than $10,000).
63. SAN FRANCISCO STUDY, supra note 53, at 40 (displaced tenants had a median income
of $22,800); BALTIMORE STUDY, supra note 62, at 38 (the median income of the displaced
households was $17,800); HUMAN RELATIONS COMM'N, supra note 53, at 6 (median income
between $15,000 and $20,000); CITY OF CAMBRIDGE, supra note 54, at 20 (50% earned be-
tween $10,000 and 20,000).
64. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS, supra note 6, at 39. See notes 58, 59, supra.
65. DEP'T OF HOUSING, supra note 20, at 21 (few equivalent vacancies exist for displaced
low and moderate income families); HUD 1980 STUDY, supra note 1, at IX-20 (31% of dis-
placed poor families or three times as many as in the general displaced population, assess their
new neighborhood as worse than their pre-conversion neighborhood).
66. N.Y. Times, May 31, 1981, at 47, col. I (reporting a study showing that elderly ten-
ants experienced serious emotional and physical disturbance when advised that their homes
were being converted); D. Marlin in EMERGENCY CONDOMINIUM AND COOPERATIVE CON-
VERSION COMM'N, supra note 19, at App. B, 7 (partial dissent).
67. Hartmann, supra note 52, at 294.
68. Displaced tenants must spend time and energy in order to find and move to substitute
housing. Half of the displaced reported difficulties in locating a new residence. HUD 1980
STUDY, supra note 1, at IX-17. In addition to this inconvenience, tenants must absorb an
average rent increase of'8% and moving costs that average $145. Id. at IX- 11, IX-21. Many
commentators try to minimize these burdens by pointing out that 38% of all tenants move
each year. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS, supra note 6, at 17. Voluntary and forced
moves differ significantly in the trauma they engender, however. Also, conversion has gener-
ally occurred in prime rental structures whose tenants are most likely to be long-term resi-
dents who do not move each year. See note 110, infra.
69. EMERGENCY CONDOMINIUM AND COOPERATIVE CONVERSION COMM'N, supra note
19, at 34, 47; B. HEUDORFER, supra note 27, at 93.
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B. The Effects of Conversion on the Adequacy of The Lower Income Housing
Stock
Because most evaluations of conversion's effects have focused on the
highly visible problem of tenant displacement, the less direct effects of
conversion on the adequacy of the lower income housing stock have re-
mained unexamined. 70  Conversion is a method by which wealthier
households are able to appropriate a larger segment of the housing stock
for their use, reducing the housing available to lower income groups. 7 1
The focus in the literature on the harms of tenant displacement obscures
the fact that when a stagnant supply of housing exists, any increase in
housing opportunities for the middle classes must come at the expense of
the lower classes.
The need of the middle classes for a larger share of the housing stock
has prompted this phenomenon. 72 The number of households in the
U.S. increased by 27% in the past decade. 73 Yet, construction of new
housing failed to keep pace with this increase. 74 Without a sufficient
number of newly built units to satisfy the increased demand for home-
ownership opportunities, the middle classes have needed to capture a
70. Several studies have focused on the problem of diminishing rental housing stock
caused by the conversion of apartment buildings. E.g., Comment, supra note 6, at 317. Loss
of rental housing is significant because certain groups, such as the young and the elderly, are
not interested in or are unable to make a commitment to an extended tenure in a particular
location. d. at 318. Many observers use an analysis of rental stock losses as a proxy for the
loss of lower income housing, however. E.g., Dreier, Atlas, Condomania, 45 THE PROGRESSIVE
19, 20 (March, 1981). The focus on the loss of rental stock does not adequately assess the
impact of conversion on poor households. See text and notes accompanying notes 73-84, infra.
71. EMERGENCY CONDOMINIUM AND COOPERATIVE CONVERSION COMM'N, supra note
19, at 19, 24 (conversion provides higher income households with housing at the expense of
the elderly, poor, and female-headed households); Goetze, supra note 16, at 52 (conversion
allows the "haves" to take over housing from the "have-nots"). See text and notes accompa-
nying notes 83, 84 zifra.
72. See text and notes accompanying notes 19-26, supra. HUD found that the 366,000
units converted in the 19 70's reduced the rental housing supply by only 18,000 available
units. HUD 1980 STUDY, supra note 1, at iii. Although the supply of rental units was reduced
by conversion, HUD recognized that the demand for rental units was also diminished since
many of the condominium buyers were former renters. For a discussion of their complex
calculations, see Id. at Ch. 7. The implicit conclusion, therefore, is that conversion does not
significantly harm the renter populations, i.e., the poor. The problem with the HUD analysis
is that in order to focus on ownership status, it creates a model with a static population of
households. Id. at VII-5, n.2. The model thus ignores the growth in the number of middle
class households and their resulting need for a greater share of the existing housing stock. As
conversion has met this need, it has reduced the housing available to poorer populations. See
text and notes accompanying notes 73-84 infra.
73. N.Y. Times, supra note 24, at Al, col. 2. This data reports the rate of new household
formation for the entire population and is not broken down by income group. The factors
leading to this increase (e.g., divorce, delayed child rearing, later marriages) are middle class
phenomenon, which would indicate that the increase in middle class households is at least
proportional to the general increase.
74. See notes 22 & 23, supra.
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greater share of the existing housing stock. Conversion has been able to
satisfy this need in a manner that has great appeal for these house-
holds.75 As conversion has created access to a larger portion of the
rental stock, it has also provided these households with the tax and in-
vestment advantages that accompany homeownership.
As the middle classes extend their grasp over a larger share of the
housing stock, the housing opportunities for the growing number of
lower income households are diminished. This ramification of conver-
sion is hidden, since the converted condominiums that middle class
households purchase are not typically located in lower income neighbor-
hoods and those displaced are not typically poor. 76 Instead, the effects of
the conversion of the better rental stock to condominiums ripple
through the housing market and affect the poor through a filtering
process.
The filtering process allocates the supply of housing through a dy-
namic that resembles a chain reaction. 77 One family's move creates a
vacancy that will become the new home of a second family. Similarly,
the move of this second family from its old residence creates a vacancy
that will be available to other families. 78
Historically, this filtering process has created housing opportunities
for low and moderate income families. 79 New houses have traditionally
been built for the middle classes. When these families moved into new
homes, their previous residences became available for occupancy by
other families. Because the pace of new home construction exceeded the
growth in the number of middle class households, these vacated resi-
dences were not needed by other middle class families and became avail-
able to less affluent households.8 0 The new occupants of these residences
had moderate incomes. Their previous residences, however, became
available to households with less resources. As this chain reaction con-
tinued, a series of families were able to move into better
accommodations. 8 '
75. See text and notes accompanying notes 26-28, supra.
76. See note 6 3 , supra.
77. For an extended discussion of the filtering process, see W. GRIGSBY, HOUSING MAR-
KETS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1963).
78. J. LANSING, C. CLIF TON, J. MORGAN, NEw HOMES AND POOR PEOPLE: A STUDY OF
CHAINS OF MovEs 2 (1969).
79. Id at 65, 66.
80. Id at 2; D. GORDON, PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL ECONOMY 357, n.17 (1971).
81. J. LANSING, C. CLIFON, J. MORGAN, supra note 78, at 65. In essence, by building a
new home, a middle class family created a new rung near the top of the ladder of housing
quality. When the middle class family moved up to this rung, its old rung became vacant.
Through the chain of moves that followed, a number of less affluent families were each able
to take a step up the housing quality ladder. Black families, however, have not benefitted
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The benefits that accrued to poorer households from this filtering pro-
cess have nearly ceased in recent years. With the decline in new home
construction, relatively few middle class households have moved from
their current residences into newly built homes. Because middle class
households have created only a small number of new rungs at the top of
the ladder, only a limited number of additional housing opportunities
have filtered down to lower income families.8 2
In fact, the filtering process has begun to reverse direction and to re-
duce the housing available to lower income households. Because the
growth in the number of middle class households has outstripped the
rate of new construction, many middle class households have been
forced to seek housing formerly occupied by other income groups. They
have gained access to this housing through condominium conversion
and have displaced other households. The households displaced by con-
version, although not as wealthy as the condominium purchasers, still
possess some economic resources which they use to obtain units that
would otherwise be available to less affluent households. 83 These less
affluent households, in turn, must seek housing previously occupied by
those with even less resources. Thus, because the growing number of
middle class households have needed additional housing units and have
been unable to move up to new rungs at the top of the ladder, they have
obtained housing on lower rungs through condominium conversion and
prompted a chain reaction that reduces the housing available to those
households with the least economic resources. 84
from filtering to the extent that white families have due to racial discrimination and income
differences. Id at 67. In addition, these chains of moves are interrupted by a variety of
factors. Only one poor family is able to move to a better residence for every three units of
new housing constructed for higher income families. Id at 66. Therefore, the filtering caused
by new construction cannot fully meet the housing needs of lower income and minority
families.
82. Note, supra note 8, at 352 n.3 1.
83. SAN FRANCISCO STUDY, supra note 53, at 40 (median income of condominium buyers
was $32,325 contrasted to $22,800 for displaced tenants); BALTIMORE STUDY, supra note 62,
at 35, 38, 40 (median income for purchasers was over $30,000, displaced tenant median in-
come equalled $17,800); HUMAN RELATIONS COMM'N, supra note 53, at 31 (median owner
income totalled between $20,000 and $30,000, displaced tenant income averaged between
$15,000 and $20,000); City of Cambridge, supra note 54, at 5, 20 (median income of new
owners was over $25,000 compared to displaced tenant median income of $10,000-$15,000).
The HUD 1980 STUDY found a less significant difference. HUD 1980 STUDY, supra note 1, at
VI-18 (39% of owners had income over $30,000 compared to 30% of the displaced).
84. J. SOLOWAY, CONDOS, CO-OPS, AND CONVERSIONS: A GUIDE ON RENTAL CONVER-
SIONS FOR LOCAL OFFICIALS 6 (Office of Planning and Research, State of California, 1979)
(conversion, even in high rent buildings, increases the competition for the remaining units
and hurts the poor the most); J. SILVER, G. SHREVE, supra note 26, at 25 (reference to the
indirect displacement of lower income households through a chain reaction).
Some observers have noted that condominium conversion merely re-shuffles the existing
housing supply because the condominium buyers vacate their previous residences which be-
come available for occupancy by other families. Condominium and Cooperative Conversion: The
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If a housing surplus existed, the problems caused by this reduction in
the housing available to lower income families might not be as exten-
sive.85 The nation is experiencing its worst housing shortage in de-
cades,8 6 however, and with the retarded pace of housing construction,
no relief is in sight.8 7 By transferring existing housing to wealthier
households, conversion places the burden of the shortage on those with
the least capacity to resolve the underlying crisis.88 Faced with an ex-
tremely tight housing market, poor families must either live in substan-
dard housing, double up, or pay more for housing.8 9
Those commentators who focus on the effect of conversion on the dis-
placed ignore this problem because they examine only the first stage of a
chain reaction. An examination of the manner in which conversion's
effects ripple through the housing market demonstrates that the benefits
of conversion for the middle classes are linked to the reduction in hous-
ing opportunities for the poor.
Federal Response: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Government Operations, House of Repre-
sentatives, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 2, p. 101 (1981) (statement of Patrick J. Rohan). Never-
theless, one cannot conclude that the housing stock available to lower income families
remains stable simply because middle class households leave behind a vacant unit for every
condominium that they occupy. But see Id at Pt. 3, p. 140 (statement of Philip D. Winn). In
a static housing market, conversion would merely re-shuffle the housing stock: the middle
class would retain the same share of the available housing, but simply occupy different units.
However, the housing market is not static. Instead, the number of middle class households is
expanding rapidly and the middle classes require a greater share of the existing housing stock.
The conversion process is able to assist the middle classes in capturing this added portion.
Because of the tax advantages of conversion, middle income households can "bid up" the
price of available housing at each step in the chain far beyond what they could afford to pay
for rental housing. This provides them with an additional advantage over low income
groups, who are unable to utilize the tax advantages of homeownership and who are often
unable to obtain the necessary downpayment to purchase an apartment. Thus middle in-
come households can successfully compete for available housing by paying higher prices with-
out an actual increase in the costs to them because of the tax subsidy.
85. The existence of an oversupply of units might diminish the harms to the poor because
they might still have access to a reasonable, though reduced, number of minimum-quality
housing units.
86. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE U.S., supra note 25, at 5 (the rental vacancy rate
declined to 4.8% in the first quarter of 1979, the lowest since tabulations began in 1956);
Koeppel, For Rent, Cheap, No Heat, 45 THE PROGRESSIVE 23, 24 (March, 1981) (vacancy rates
of 2% or less exist in many cities).
87. See notes 22, 23, supra.
88. Since conversion in most instances does not reduce the number of dwelling units, it is
clear that conversion does not create the housing shortage. Conversion's effect is to satisfy the
needs of middle class households and thus to insure that the burdens of the shortage fall on
those with lower incomes. Historically, however, housing has only been built for higher in-
come groups because of the inability of lower income households to support new construction.
See note 80, supra.
89. J. SOLOWAY, supra note 84, at 6 (38% of California's lower income renters pay a dis-
proportionate share of their income for housing; many are forced to double up or to locate far
from work or city services); COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE U.S., supra note 25, at 9-10
(poor families are paying increasing portions of their income for housing and live in substan-
dard conditions).
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IV. A Comparison of the Benefits and Harms of Conversion
A comparison of the benefits and costs associated with condominium
conversion indicates that on balance conversion is not a constructive so-
cial force.
The main benefits of conversion accrue to the participants in the
transaction: the apartment building owner, the condominium converter,
and the condominium unit buyers. Conversion is able to benefit each
participant because it improves the federal tax treatment of a rental
property by transforming it into homeownership units. The purpose of
the tax provisions that subsidize homeownership is to encourage the
construction of new homes.9° By stimulating home construction, the tax
law intends to improve the nation's housing stock and the general eco-
nomic health of the country. With the growth in conversion as a means
to satisfy the demand for homeownership, however, the federal tax sub-
sidy of homeownership has increasingly been utilized to redistribute the
nation's housing stock rather than to increase it. 9 1 Because the subsidy
fails in these circumstances to stimulate housing production or any sig-
nificant housing reclamation, it creates little social benefit. Instead, the
tax subsidy merely represents a transfer payment of substantial propor-
tions to the participants in the conversion transaction. Although con-
version is able to benefit those parties involved in conversion activity,
these benefits are directly offset by a governmental tax expenditure that
accomplishes little of its intended social purposes.
The other benefit attributed to conversion is its contribution to urban
revitalization. As shown previously, this benefit, too, is overstated. The
gains to urban centers from conversion activity are in reality quite
modest.
By contrast, the drawbacks to conversion are substantial and greatly
outweigh its benefits. Conversion burdens lower income households by
reducing their housing options. In addition, the poor and elderly resi-
90. It is generally believed that this provision and the other portions of the code that
favor homeownership are intended to stimulate the housing industry and the economy. See,
e.g., 2 B. BITrKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES, AND GIrrs 31-3 (1981) (the
provision's perpetuation may reflect a legislative desire to stimulate the nation's economy by
encouraging the use of credit to purchase homes, autos, and other consumer goods). Congress
has never made explicit its reasons for the personal interest deduction that lies at the core of
the homeownership preference, however, even though this deduction has been part of the tax
code since 1913. Id at 31-3; Goetze, supra note 16, at 44, 50-51, 52 (tax reductions for home-
owners are received to promote new housing construction).
91. See Goetze, supra note 16, at 44 (tax favoritism for homeowners no longer adds to the
housing supply; instead it merely induces affluent households to overconsume while the needy
are left out).
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dents of converted buildings experience severe difficulties when forced to
move.
Conversion also diminishes the pressure for new construction, the only
long-term answer to the nation's housing troubles. New housing is usu-
ally built for the middle classes since they possess the resources to pay for
new high-quality units.9 2 But conversion reduces the interest of these
households in new construction since they are able to qualify for the
homeownership subsidy as condominium owners. As conversion satisfies
the homeownership demands of the middle classes and places the bur-
dens of the housing shortage on lower income families, the pressure for
additional housing comes from those least able to support new
construction.
Consideration should thus be given to measures that would reshape
governmental policy to protect the lower income housing stock, mini-
mize the effects of displacement, and insure that the effect of the govern-
ment's homeownership subsidy more closely adheres to its original
purpose of encouraging new home construction.
V. The Regulation of Condominium Conversion
A number of strategies have been proposed to address the problems
posed by condominium conversion. This section will present these op-
tions, analyze their impact, and propose a preferred policy in this area.
A. Strategy of Governmental Non-Intervention
One approach to the regulation of condominium conversion is a pol-
icy of non-interference. This approach presumes that conversion is a
natural response to the market pressures created by the consumers and
suppliers of housing. As a market force created by thousands of in-
dependent actors pursuing their own best interests, it is suggested that
conversion should receive special deference and be immune from gov-
ernmental interference. This view concludes that governmental inter-
vention would reduce the effectiveness of the marketplace in satisfying
the public's housing needs and produce serious unanticipated conse-
quences due to the inexact nature of intervention strategies.
Whatever the merit of governmental non-intervention in other-sectors
of the economy, the application of this philosophy to the condominium
conversion market is unwise. The assumption that conversion is a free
market force is inaccurate. As indicated earlier, conversion is a product
of the federal tax law, not of the free market. Although thousands of
92. See note 80, supra.
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independent actors have demanded converted condominiums in the
housing marketplace, these parties are in fact seeking the federal tax
benefits that attach to homeownership properties. As the product of
governmental tax policies, condominium conversion does not deserve
any special protection from governmental regulation that might be pro-
vided true market forces. Therefore, to the extent that conversion is an
undesirable phenomenon, government should adjust its intervention in
the housing market to diminish conversion's harms.
B. Regulation of The Process of Condominium Conversion
A variety of regulations have been proposed to alter the process of
conversion so that tenants are provided with a reasonable opportunity
to purchase their units and are treated fairly if they are unable to buy.
Provisions that provide tenants prior notice of conversion and the first
option to purchase their units are widely supported and have been
adopted in many jurisdictions. 9 3 Some observers have also advocated
relocation assistance for displaced households and prohibiting or delay-
ing eviction of elderly and handicapped tenants. 9 4
These proposals are aimed only at the immediate displacement prob-
lem and will only address the predicament of tenants in the apartment
buildings undergoing conversion. Even with regulations of this nature,
conversion activity will continue and will appropriate the lower income
housing stock for the middle classes. 95 Unless the level of conversion
93. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 6, at 331, 332. The Uniform Condominium Act and
Model Condominium Code contain these protections. Id. at 328, 329. Eighteen states have
adopted the notice requirement; fourteen create a tenant right of first refusal. HUD 1980
STUDY, supra note 1, at XI-5. Several localities have passed similar provisions. Id. at XII-8,
XII-14.
94. E.g., Comment, supra note 6, at 331, 332. Five states require relocation assistance be
provided to displaced tenants and three provide extended tenancies for elderly or handi-
capped tenants. HUD 1980 STUDY, supra note 1, at XI-5, XI-20. One-fourth of municipali-
ties with conversion ordinances require relocation assistance for tenants and several have
adopted additional protections for the elderly or handicapped. Id. at XII-9, XII-16.
A related category of proposals attempts to preserve particular dwelling units or buildings
for lower income households. Such measures require a certain percentage of units in each
converted building to be set aside for lower income renters, provide financial assistance for
households to purchase their units, or facilitate tenants' purchase their buildings to create low
income cooperatives. HUD 1980 STUDY, supra note 1, at XI-20, XII-15, XII-30. These meas-
ures will protect the residents of the targeted apartments from displacement. Because these
measures do not reduce the demand for conversion, however, they will in all likelihood merely
shift conversion to other buildings, rather than retard the overall level of activity. Note, Regu-
lalory Responses to the Condominium Conversion Crisis, 59 WASH. U. L. Q. 513, 533 (1981). Thus
displacement will simply occur elsewhere and conversion's role in reducing the lower income
housing stock will not be altered.
95. Regulations that protect existing tenants might create sufficient administrative costs
to developers that they may decide to forego conversion. Regulations of this nature have not
seemed to have significantly affected converters thus far, however. These regulations are
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activity is restricted, conversion's negative effect on the housing oppor-
tunities of lower income households will continue unabated.
C. Restrictions on the Level of Conversion Activity
Conversion can also be regulated by direct governmental restrictions
on the number of condominium conversions. One such proposal is con-
tained in a federal bill submitted by U.S. Representative Benjamin Ro-
senthal. It would create a three-year nationwide moratorium on
condominium conversion. 96 Other proposals would restrict conversion
at the municipal level through local ordinance. Measures of this type
that have been adopted include: prohibitions on conversion when
rental vacancy rates fall below a designated percentage; 9 7 quotas re-
stricting conversion to a limited number of units98 or to a percentage of
the locality's new rental construction;99 and systems of discretionary ap-
proval by a local board' ° or the building's tenants.101
By restricting the rate of condominium conversion, these proposals
minimize both the harms of displacement and conversion's role in re-
ducing the housing opportunities of lower income households. 102 The
difficulty with these efforts is to insure that they are both adapted to
local conditions and comprehensive. Though comprehensive in scope, a
national moratorium would be totally insensitive to local housing mar-
kets. Conversion would be proscribed even in areas with high vacancy
rates where the reduction in the housing stock of lower income groups is
less harmful due to the general oversupply of housing. 0 3 In these re-
gions, regulations that minimize the effects of displacement may be suffi-
common in areas with significant conversion activity. See HUD 1980 STUDY, supra note 1, at
IV-7, XI-5; ADVANCE MORTGAGE CORPORATION, supra note 2, at 4-12.
96. 125 CONG. REc. H7346 (daily ed. September 5, 1979) (statement of Rep. Rosenthal).
97. See Lauber, supra note 53, at 204. For a discussion of the administrative problems
associated with such ordinances, see Note, Municipal Regulation of Condomitium Conversions in
California, 53 S. CALIFORNIA L. R. 225, 267-268 (1979).
98. See Note, supra note 97, at 237 (citing a San Francisco ordinance that permits only
1000 conversions annually).
99. J. SoLowAv, supra note 84, at 14 (citing a La Mesa, California, measure that restricts
conversion to an amount equal to 50% of the average new rental units constructed in the past
two years).
100. Comment, Conversion of Apartments to Condominiums: Social and Economic Regulations
Under the California Subdivision Map Act, 16 CALIFORNIA W. L. R. 466, 491-492 (1980) (citing a
Vallejo, California, ordinance placing discretionary approval power with the City Planning
Commission).
101. Note, supra note 97, at 235, 266, 268-273.
102. As these ordinances halt conversion, they protect the lower income housing stock.
See text and notes accompanying notes 109-114, infra.
103. Snyderman, Morrison, Rental Market Protection Through the Conversion Moratorium: Legal
Limits andAlternatives, 29 DEPAUL L. R. 973, 1006 (1980) (federal and even statewide actions
do not adequately recognize that housing markets are predominantly local). See also note 85,
supra.
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cient, but a nationwide prohibition would prevent conversion in every
locale. Statewide prohibitions would have similar problems.104
In contrast, local measures would be more sensitive to housing market
conditions in each community. Yet, these measures are not likely to be
sufficiently comprehensive. Since most housing markets encompass sev-
eral cities, municipal prohibitions might merely shift conversion activity
among cities within a region. This problem would be remedied only if
several adjacent municipalities simultaneously enact ordinances of a
similar nature. The practical difficulties in securing such regional coop-
eration might be insurmountable.
D. Improving the Economics of Rental Housi'ng
Many commentators have suggested that the best way to discourage
condominium conversion and prompt badly-needed new construction is
to improve the profitability of rental housing through governmental ac-
tions. One proposal of this nature would increase the federal subsidy of
rental buildings through tax breaks for housing investors. 0 5 Another
measure calls for the government to improve the ability of the renter
population to pay for housing by additional transfer payments to lower
income households.10 6
The political feasibility of these alternatives is very low, however, be-
cause of the enormous costs of such proposals. In order to diminish con-
version activity, not only must these efforts increase the profitability of
104. See note 103, supra.
105. See, e.g., Rosenthal, The Legality and Practiality of Condominium Conversion Moratoriums,
34 U. MIAMI L. R. 1199, 1226 (1980).
106. See, e.g., Koeppel, supra note 86, at 25. Even if transfer payments to the poor were
increased, poor families are likely to spend these additional resources on items other than
housing. M. BENDICK, JR., J. ZAIS, INCOMES AND HOUSING: LESSONS FROM EXPERIMENTS
WITH HOUSING ALLOWANCES 3 (1978). Housing subsidy programs may be able to increase
housing expenditures by altering the flexible character of the transfer payment, however.
The federal Lower Income Housing Assistance Program (Section 8) pays poor families the
difference between the cost of standard housing in their locality and 25% of their adjusted
family income and has had the effect of increasing housing expenditures. M. DRURY, 0. LEE,
M. SPRINGER AND L. YAP, LOWER INCOME HOUSING ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (SECTION 8):
NATIONWIDE EVALUATION OF THE EXISTING HOUSING PROGRAM 70-72 (United States
Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., 1978).
Other proposals related to these efforts to improve the economics of rental housing seek to
tax condominium conversion to raise money for lower income housing programs. Comment,
supra note 6, at 321 (a transfer tax of 5% on the first sale of a converted condominium, the
proceeds of which would be used for rent subsidies, and relocation assistance); HUD 1980
STUDY, supra note 1, at XII-3 1. These proposals would either slow the pace of conversion by
raising the price of converted units or provide some financial resources to assist low income
families. The rate of tax in most proposals is low enough so that conversion would continue,
but some revenue would be raised. For example, a Los Angeles ordinance that requires a
$500 payment for each unit converted will halt few conversions. See Id at XII-31. The reve-
nue raised by such measures will in all likelihood not be sufficient to construct new low in-
come units or provide much long-range assistance to poor families, however.
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rental ownership to an acceptable level, the subsidies must be large
enough to counteract the windfalls available to an investor who converts
to condominiums.10 7 Similarly, new rental construction would not be
undertaken unless a substantial subsidy is available.10 8 Thus, although
additional subsidies for housing may represent a constructive approach
to the nation's housing problems, these measures would be tremendously
expensive and are unlikely to be adopted given the current political
climate.
E. The Refusal of Homeownership Tax Status to Owners of Converted
Condominiums
The final regulatory option and the recommended alternative is to
refuse preferential tax treatment to owners of condominiums that have
been converted from apartments. Owners of condominiums converted
after enactment of this legislation would be treated as though they
owned an investment property and would be required to impute rental
income. In turn they would be able to deduct operating expenses and
depreciation as well as mortgage interest and property tax payments,
and would be subject to capital gains tax on the unit's appreciation. For
administrative simplicity, the Internal Revenue Service may prefer a
proposal that simply removes the deduction for mortgage interest and
property tax payments. This change would free the I.R.S. of the burden
of calculating imputed rents, but would have essentially the same eco-
nomic effect. Owners of newly built condominiums and purchasers of
previously converted condominiums would continue to receive preferen-
tial homeownership treatment.
The object of this tax amendment is to steer those demanding home-
ownership units away from existing rental structures. The amendment
would substantially slow the pace of conversion activity by denying gov-
ernmental tax benefits to the owners of converted condominiums. The
amendment, however, would not prohibit conversion. If the conversion
of an apartment building is able to create economic value independent
of the transaction's tax consequences, it would be able to proceed, but
107. Although only the best of the rental stock has been the focus of conversion activity to
date, it would not be possible to target a tax measure designed to prevent conversion on these
buildings. Every rental building would receive a tax subsidy so that the highest quality rental
units would not be converted. It is obvious that the cost of this sort of measure would be
extraordinarily high.
108. At current rent levels, privately financed rental units are not economically feasible.
COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE U.S., supra note 25, at 11. Rents must rise by 25% in order
to stimulate new construction. M. at 13. Regardless of whether these increases in a building's
income come from tenants who are able to pay higher rents due to an additional transfer
payment or from tax expenditures, the cost to the federal treasury would be enormous.
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would simply not receive any federal income tax benefits. Thus, the
amendment to the Internal Revenue Code would be sensitive to local
conditions, but comprehensive in scope.
The amendment would also be sensitive to the expectations of house-
holds who have already purchased converted condominiums. I hey
would continue to receive homeowner's tax status and would be able to
pass that status on to future purchasers, thereby protecting the market
value of their investment. In all future conversions, it would be clear at
the time of initial purchase whether the units will receive homeowner's
tax treatment and presumably the condominiums would be priced
accordingly.
The key question is whether the reduction in conversion activity cre-
ated by these changes would achieve the objective of protecting the
housing stock of lower income groups. The effectiveness of the proposal
would depend on the response of the middle classes. The middle classes
are seeking both access to additional portions of the housing stock and
ownership units that qualify for preferential tax treatment. In the ab-
sence of conversion, the middle classes would have two main options:
creating new ownership units through the construction of homes or new
condominiums or entering the rental market.' 0 9
To the extent that middle class households enter the rental market,
the housing available to lower income groups would continue to dimin-
ish. The middle classes would be able to outbid those with fewer re-
sources for the better rental units, thereby reducing the housing for
lower income families through the filtering process.
There is good reason to believe that the rental option would not be
preferred, however. Without the high turnover created by conversion in
prime rental buildings, the middle classes would have difficulty gaining
access to top-quality rental units which characteristically have low turn-
over rates.' 0 Additionally, rental choice fails to confer the benefits of
109. A third option is to reduce the number of households through shared arrangements.
The merger of households is a common occurrence in tight housing markets. Downs, supra
note 16, at 3. By restricting conversion's use by the middle class as a means to gain access to
additional housing units, unrelated individuals who are currently living alone may decide to
join together to rent or purchase housing in order to share the increasing costs of housing.
Already the number of households composed of unrelated individuals is rising. BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, POPULATION PROFILE OF THE UNITED STATES:
1980 22 (Current Population Reports Series P-20, No. 363, 1981) (the number of non-family
households of two or more persons increased by 162% between 1970 and 1980 from 1.8 mil-
lion to 2.9 million households). And many homes are being purchased jointly by unrelated
parties. Wall Street J., April 17, 1981, at 1, col. 6; Chicago Tribune, November 9, 1980, § 14,
at 2E, col. 1.
110. Lauber, supra note 53, at 206 (residents in buildings undergoing conversion in Evans-




homeownership demanded by the middle classes. In contrast, new
home construction presents the middle classes with access to additional
high quality units and to homeownership and its benefits. The problem
usually identified with newly constructed units is their exceptionally
high price."I But a comparison of the sales prices of converted condo-
miniums and newly built condominiums reveals that the new units are
only slightly more expensive and that the difference is diminishing.112
Thus, if converted condominiums were no longer an attractive or avail-
able alternative, middle class households might increasingly choose to
buy newly built units. New construction adds units to the housing sup-
ply, thereby lessening the need of the middle classes for a greater share
of the existing housing stock. In shifting the attention of the middle
classes from conversion to new construction, this tax amendment would
protect the housing stock of the poor from the threat posed by the ex-
panding number of middle class households.
VI. Conclusion
A major weakness of the policy debate on condominium conversion
has been a failure to appreciate the central role of the federal tax law in
encouraging conversion activity. Even when the importance of federal
tax policy is noticed, these statutes are viewed as though they were an
unchangeable element of the real estate environment. This unquestion-
ing acceptance of the current tax law may be based on political judg-
ment; the homeownership preferences in the tax code have a large and
powerful constituency. Rather than abolishing all homeownership ben-
efits, however, the proposed changes in homeowner tax treatment would
be made at the margins and prospectively only. The political obstacles
to change would be significantly less than for proposals affecting real
estate transactions generally, yet conversion would be significantly
affected.
In addition to assessing the political feasibility of amending the tax
laws, the merits of the policy of granting homeownership benefits to
owners of converted condominiums must be evaluated. The assessment
conducted in this paper reveals that beyond the immediate financial
111. An additional problem that may detract from the attractiveness of new construction
is the shortage of land available for construction near the center cities. This problem is more
pronounced in major metropolitan centers like New York City. In such areas, some middle
class families may prefer to rent in central locations rather than buy residences in areas that
require a longer commute to the center city. To the extent that middle class families remain
in the rental market, they will continue to reduce the housing available to lower income
groups.
112. ADVANCE MORTGAGE CORPORATION, supra note 2, at 2, 3.
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benefits for conversion's participants, conversion's benefits are quite lim-
ited. Conversion, however, does seriously reduce the housing available
to lower income groups and harms the poor and the elderly who are
displaced by conversion. Because this portion of the tax code encour-
ages an activity that creates more harm than benefit, the law should be
amended to refuse homeownership benefits to owners of newly con-
verted condominiums. This amendment would reduce conversion levels
and the costs associated with conversion. It would also create additional
pressure for the expansion of the nation's housing stock during a period
of housing shortage. This tax amendment would permit the federal gov-
ernment to shift its tax expenditure from conversion activity that merely
redistributes the existing housing stock to new construction activity that
increases the total supply of housing.
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